Poverty Knowledge, Coercion, and Social Rights: A Discourse Ethical Contribution to Social Epistemology by Ingram, David
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Philosophy: Faculty Publications and Other Works Faculty Publications
2014
Poverty Knowledge, Coercion, and Social Rights: A
Discourse Ethical Contribution to Social
Epistemology
David Ingram
Loyola University Chicago, dingram@luc.edu
Author Manuscript
This is a pre-publication author manuscript of the final, published article.
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Philosophy: Faculty Publications and Other Works by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact
ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
© 2013 David Ingram
Recommended Citation
Ingram, David. Poverty Knowledge, Coercion, and Social Rights: A Discourse Ethical Contribution to Social Epistemology. , , : , 2014.
Retrieved from Loyola eCommons, Philosophy: Faculty Publications and Other Works,
Ingram, David, Poverty Knowledge, Coercion, and Social Rights: A Discourse Ethical Contribution to 
Social Epistemology, Excerpt from work forthcoming in 2014, Oxford University Press 
1 
 In today’s America the persistence of crushing poverty in the midst of staggering affluence no 
longer incites the righteous jeremiads it once did. Resigned acceptance of this paradox is fueled by a 
sense that poverty lies beyond the moral and technical scope of government remediation. The failure of 
experts to reach agreement on the causes of poverty merely exacerbates our despair. Are the causes 
internal to the poor – reflecting their more or less voluntary choices? Or do they emanate from structures 
beyond their control (but perhaps amenable to government remediation)? If both of these explanations are 
true (as I believe they are), poverty experts will need to shift their focus to a hitherto under-theorized 
concept: coercion. 
 I defend this claim by appealing to distinct areas of philosophical inquiry: social epistemology 
and moral theory. Poverty knowledge is directly related to both of these inquiries. The aim of poverty 
knowledge is clearly moral: to reduce suffering and to empower the weak. While the former aim is 
grounded in utilitarian thinking, the latter aim is grounded in the social contractarian insight that poverty 
is unjustly coercive, imposing excessive limits on the opportunities and choices of the poor that render 
them vulnerable to domination by others. Equally obvious is the social nature of poverty knowledge. All 
knowledge depends on the reliable testimony of others. Poverty knowledge not only ostensibly offers us 
the most reliable, scientific beliefs about the causes and effects of poverty, thereby determining how we 
morally judge the poor and their poverty, but it reciprocally bases its understanding of poverty on what 
the poor themselves have to say about it. 
 What unites both social epistemology and moral theory – at least the social contract variants I will 
be examining here – is concern about the limits and possibilities of rational choice. As poverty knowledge 
came of age in the fifties and sixties, it absorbed the language of rational choice prevalent in economics, 
especially the Keynesian economics whose moral underpinnings can be found in Rawlsian social contract 
theory. Echoing a different economic theory supported by a different, more libertarian, brand of social 
contract theory, poverty expertise in the eighties continued to use an abstract model of rational choice. I 
submit that, in both early and later epochs of poverty expertise, reliance on rational choice reasoning 
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prevented poverty experts from appreciating the coercive impact of poverty on the poor. Social 
epistemology explains this failure by demonstrating the poverty of rational choice thinking and its 
mistaken reliance on inflated commonsense expectations about the capacity of individuals to calculate 
their long-term interests, free from the distortions of social bias. Social epistemology not only exhibits the 
dangers of not relying on expert testimony, but it also exhibits the dangers of relying on an unreliable 
source of expert testimony that has removed itself from its human subject matter. 
 In order for poverty experts to become more reliable educators about poverty’s coercive impact 
on the poor they must return to their discipline’s social epistemological roots. Only a more descriptive 
and explanatory sociology can narrate a comprehensive story about how the lived experience of poverty 
relates to the larger social system. The social contractarian model best suited to underwriting this kind of 
poverty knowledge, I submit, is the discourse theoretic model that has been championed by Jürgen 
Habermas. When applied as a pedagogical method of dialog and not as a social contractarian model of 
rational normative consent, discourse theory highlights the unique epistemological advantages of 
empathetic understanding that are so essential to dispelling stereotypes about the poor. Dispelling these 
stereotypes is the first step toward respecting the poor as free agents who are nonetheless forced to make 
suboptimal choices. 
 My defense of these claims proceeds as follows: Part One argues that poverty expertise rightly 
deserves the opprobrium critics have heaped on it. The charge – leveled by progressives and 
conservatives alike - that such expertise is ideological (unscientific) is true to the extent that poverty 
knowledge has all-too-easily accommodated the political aims of the agency that has funded it: the federal 
government. The shift from the war on poverty to the war on the poor – and the resulting shift from 
blaming poverty on economic structures to blaming it on the culture of poverty – would not have been 
possible without an increased emphasis on data gathering aimed at measuring poverty rather than 
describing it. Part Two assesses the consequences of turning away from qualitative research to statistical 
analysis: the coercive nature of poverty becomes invisible beneath the surface of aggregate individual 
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choices. The failure to grasp how voluntary choices, ostensibly based on rational, self-interested 
calculations, can be coerced by social structures - and thereby lead to sub-optimizing behavior – invites 
the conclusion that the poor have only themselves to blame for their misery. Part Three suggests that this 
pathologization of the poor directly controverts the major aim of poverty research: to empower the poor 
as free and equal parties to the social contract. I argue that the different varieties of social contract theory 
that have justified poverty expertise over the last forty years – the welfarist (distributivist) model 
pioneered by Rawls and the market-based (libertarian) model defended by Nozick – embrace the same 
rational choice models favored by poverty experts and so conspire with the latter in neglecting important 
dimensions of poverty-related coercion. While the welfarist model conceals the coercive nature of 
bureaucratically administered entitlement programs and top-down urban renewal policies, the market-
based model conceals the coercive nature of economic class structures. The discourse-theoretic alternative 
proposed by Habermas endorses a populist, democratic response to the overly abstract rational choice 
assumptions embedded in these other models. 
 Despite this advance over its counterparts, the chief advantage of discourse theory for poverty 
knowledge, I submit, resides less in its proposed procedure of rational collective choice than in its 
heuristic as a dialogical method of social learning. I demonstrate this claim in Part Four, where I turn to 
the social epistemological insights of Allen Buchanan. Social epistemology offers a much needed 
corrective to theories of knowledge that rely on the reasoning capacities of isolated individuals. By 
stressing the connection between moral response and social belief, on one hand, and the dependence of 
social belief on epistemic authorities, on the other, social epistemologists suggest ways in which we can 
learn to distinguish reliable from unreliable authorities and become aware of our own error-prone 
cognitive proclivities. Their insights need to be supplemented by moral epistemologists who stress the 
affective dimension of knowledge, above all, the role that empathy plays in understanding the plight of 
others. Drawing from victim narratives, Diana Meyers shows that switching between first-person 
experiences of one's own and third-person (imaginative) reconstructions of others' experiences is essential 
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to appreciating the gravity of human rights violations and the seriousness of human rights claims. It goes 
without saying that such empathy is just as essential to understanding the plight of the poor. Meyers 
mainly has in mind empathetic understanding that has been facilitated by third-person observation and 
literary encounter, but the importance of visceral and corporeal representation suggests that face-to-face 
dialog may sometimes be a more effective way to facilitate empathetic understanding. 
 
